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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective: Assess whether a commitment contract informed by behavioral economics leads to 
persistent virologic suppression among HIV-positive patients with poor antiretroviral therapy 
(ART) adherence. 
 
Design: Single-center pilot randomized clinical trial, plus a non-randomized control group. 
 
Setting: Publicly-funded HIV clinic in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. 
 
Intervention: The study involved three arms. (i) Participants in the provider visit incentive arm 
received $30 after attending each scheduled provider visit. (ii) Participants in the incentive 
choice arm were given a choice between the above arrangement and a commitment contract 
that made the $30 payment conditional on both attending the provider visit and meeting an ART 
adherence threshold. (iii) The passive control arm received routine care and no incentives. 
 
Participants: 110 HIV-infected adults with a recent plasma HIV-1 viral load (pVL) >200 
copies/mL despite ART. The sample sizes of the three groups were as follows: provider visit 
incentive, n=21; incentive choice, n=19; passive control, n=70. 
 
Main outcome measure: Virologic suppression (pVL≤200 copies/mL) at the end of the incentive 
period and at an unanticipated post-incentive study visit approximately three months later. 
 
Results: The odds of suppression were higher in the incentive choice arm than in the passive 
control arm at the post-incentive visit (adjusted odds ratio 3.93, 95%CI 1.19 to 13.04, p=0.025). 
The differences relative to the passive control arm at the end of the incentive period and relative 
to the provider visit incentive arm at both points in time were not statistically significant. 
 
Conclusion: Commitment contracts can improve ART adherence and virologic suppression. 
 
Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov identifier NCT01455740 
 
Key Words: Behavioral Economics, Commitment Contract, Financial Incentives, Antiretroviral 
Therapy, Adherence, HIV-1 Virologic Suppression 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence is critical for HIV treatment to be successful but remains 
difficult for many individuals to maintain.1,2 Barriers to adherence include socioeconomic status, 
mental health, and substance abuse.3–6 Interventions that can improve adherence and 
demonstrate sustained virologic suppression for people living with HIV (PLWH) are needed. 
Conditional cash transfers (CCT)—monetary rewards tied to adherence—have produced mixed 
results in improving ART adherence.7–15 Even when financial incentives have shown positive 
impacts on adherence and viral suppression, the effect does not persist once incentives are 
withdrawn.15 
 
This study leverages behavioral economics to improve the design of financial incentives for ART 
adherence.16–19 Individuals often intend to engage in healthy behaviors in the future, but when 
the moment to engage in such a behavior arrives, they frequently fail to follow through on their 
intentions, instead making choices that are expedient at the time. Commitment contracts allow 
individuals to tie their own hands—by choosing to make future incentive payments contingent 
on following through on good intentions, individuals can increase their own engagement in 
healthy behaviors.20,21 Commitment contracts have proved effective in promoting healthy 
behaviors, but to our knowledge they have never been used in HIV care.22–26 
 
We hypothesized that participants offered a commitment contract for ART adherence would be 
more likely to be virologically suppressed at the end of the period during which the incentives 
were in effect, as well as at an unanticipated study visit after incentives had ended. To test our 
hypothesis, we used a randomized trial design combined with a comparison to a non-
randomized control group, studying patients on appropriate ART having virologic failure within a 
publicly-funded HIV clinic serving Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Design 
 
The study used a randomized trial design for two treatment arms: (i) Participants in the provider 
visit incentive (PVI) arm were told that they would receive $30 after attending each scheduled 
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provider visit (a CCT). (ii) Participants in the incentive choice (IC) arm were given a choice 
between the above CCT and a commitment contract, which made the $30 payment conditional 
on the patient attending the provider visit and meeting an ART adherence threshold. A block 
randomization scheme, stratified on whether or not the majority of the participant’s three 
previous viral load measurements were suppressed, assigned 21 individuals to the PVI arm and 
19 to the IC arm. 
 
The study also included 70 individuals in a passive control (PC) arm, who did not receive 
financial incentives. Individuals in the PC arm were not enrolled in the randomized trial but met 
basic study eligibility criteria during the same time period. 
 
Inclusion Criteria 
 
Participants in the PVI and IC arms were PLWH who attended the Grady Health System 
Infectious Disease Program (IDP). They were enrolled during November 2011 – April 2012 and 
were followed for a median of 15 months. To be eligible, an individual’s most recent HIV-1 
plasma RNA viral load (pVL) must have been > 200 copies/mL and must have been measured 
within the prior 18 months and at least 6 months after starting the current ART regimen. The 
pool was further restricted to English-speaking adults who filled prescriptions through IDP, were 
not using pillboxes, were not planning to relocate, and were not enrolled in another trial. 
 
To create a matched PC arm based on observational data, we identified individuals via IDP 
electronic health records (EHR). Because recruitment for the PVI and IC arms involved asking 
clinical staff to refer individuals who had difficulty with adherence, we restricted our search to 
adults who registered pVL > 200 copies/mL at some point in 2011 after having been on ART for 
at least six months. To parallel the enrollment process of the PVI and IC arms, we then 
narrowed the sample to individuals who visited IDP during 2012 and whose most recent pVL 
was > 200 copies/mL and measured within the prior six months. We further narrowed the 
sample to individuals who filled prescriptions through IDP and were not in the PVI or IC arms. 
The 2012 visit was considered the “enrollment visit,” and we tracked individuals forward in time 
from that point. 
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Description of the Intervention 
 
All participants received the standard of care (SOC) at IDP, which included not only medical 
care but also a wide range of social services. In addition, participants in the PVI and IC arms 
received financial incentives designed to motivate health-improving behaviors. After the initial 
study enrollment visit, participants in the PVI arm received a $30 payment each time they 
showed up as scheduled for one of their next four HIV primary care visits. At the initial study 
enrollment visit, participants in the IC arm chose between either the incentive scheme assigned 
to the PVI arm (Attend Clinic Get Paid, ACGP) or an incentive scheme that tied payments to 
clinic attendance and ART medication adherence (Take Medications and Attend Clinic Get Paid, 
TMACGP). More precisely, participants who selected TMACGP received a $30 payment at each 
of their next four HIV primary care visits if they (i) showed up as scheduled and (ii) presented a 
dose-recording pill bottle cap indicating that they correctly took at least 90% of doses of a 
sentinel medication since the previous study visit (see the Supplementary Materials for the 
algorithm for assigning a sentinel medication). 
 
Participants in the PVI and IC arms were also asked to return for a sixth, unanticipated study 
visit approximately three months after the last of the four study visits to which the incentive 
scheme applied. To reduce attrition, participants were offered $100 for showing up to the fifth 
and sixth study visits. 
 
Data Collection 
 
In both the PVI and IC arms, questionnaires were administered at each study visit, and 
adherence was measured using a dose-recording cap (Aardex Group, Switzerland). 
 
EHR data were collected for all three arms, with “study visits” for the PC arm selected to match 
the study visit schedule for the other arms as closely as possible. HIV-1 pVL was assessed 
using Abbott Real Time HIV-1 assay (Abbott RT, Abbott Diagnostics, Wiesbaden, Germany). 
The primary outcome of interest was virologic suppression (pVL ≤ 200 copies/mL, in 
accordance with Department of Health and Human Services guidelines at the time of the study) 
at the fifth study visit. A second outcome of interest was virologic suppression at the sixth visit. 
Missing values for pVL were coded as failures, but in supplementary analyses we find similar 
results using inverse probability weighting to correct for missing values. 
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Statistical Power 
 
The study had 51% statistical power to detect an absolute difference of 30 percentage points 
between the PVI and IC groups’ rates of virologic suppression at a 5% significance level for a 
two-sided test. Comparing the IC and PC arms, the study had 67% power to detect the same 
difference. 
 
Statistical Analysis  
 
We used logistic regression to estimate the unadjusted and adjusted impact of the IC treatment 
relative to the PVI arm and relative to the PC arm. The predictor variables included treatment 
arm indicators and the stratifying variable. Our hypothesis tests were constructed relying on the 
asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimator, but we obtained similar results when 
we conducted permutation tests. All statistical procedures were implemented using Stata 13 
(StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Baseline Characteristics and Data Summary 
 
Supplementary analyses indicate that the three arms had similar demographic and clinical 
characteristics at baseline, although individuals in the PC arm were older (median age 48.93 
years) than individuals in the IC arm (median 40.10) and PVI arm (median 42.88). Individuals in 
the IC arm had higher pVL values leading up to the enrollment visit relative to individuals in the 
other arms. The PC arm had a higher rate of missing pVL measurements at the fifth study visit 
compared to the other arms. 
 
In the IC arm, 48% of participants had at least one suppressed viral load measurement across 
the three visits prior to the enrollment visit. The percentage was 43% in the PVI arm and 36% in 
the PC arm. Thus, many individuals in the study had experienced some previous success in 
achieving viral suppression, although some individuals in the study had faced much more 
difficulty achieving success in the past. 
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Plasma HIV-1 Viral Load Suppression 
 
Figure 1 shows that for the three visits prior to enrollment, the percentage of individuals with 
suppressed viral load measurements was similar across arms. At the fifth study visit, the 
percentages suppressed were: IC arm 42%, PVI arm 38%, and PC arm 34%. At the sixth study 
visit, the percentages were: IC arm 68%, PVI arm 43%, and PC arm 41%. 
 
Table 1 shows logistic regression results. The adjusted odds ratio of suppression in the IC arm 
relative to the PVI arm at the fifth visit was 1.57 (95%CI 0.25 to 9.92; p-value 0.630), and in the 
IC arm relative to the PC arm it was 1.44 (95%CI 0.46 to 4.49; p-value 0.52). At the sixth visit, 
the adjusted odds ratio of virologic suppression in the IC arm relative to the PVI arm was 3.38 
(95%CI 0.77 to 14.84; p-value 0.107), and in the IC arm relative to the PC arm it was 3.93 
(95%CI 1.19 to 13.04; p-value 0.025). 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study demonstrated the feasibility of using commitment contracts in HIV care. Many 
previous interventions have produced statistically significant effects on ART adherence that do 
not persist after the intervention ends. A notable feature of our study is that after the incentives 
for ART adherence and provider visits were removed, participants who had been offered a 
commitment contract for ART adherence were more likely to achieve virologic suppression 
relative to individuals who had been assigned a conditional cash transfer for provider visits and 
relative to individuals who had been assigned the standard of care, although the difference was 
only statistically significant in the latter comparison. There were differences in the prevalence of 
missing outcomes across groups, but these differences were not statistically significant for the 
unanticipated post-incentive visit and therefore were unlikely to be the explanation for the 
results. Thus, financial rewards coupled with individual choice can increase engagement in 
healthy behaviors after incentives are removed. 
 
In the face of mixed evidence regarding the efficacy of conditional cash transfers for promoting 
ART adherence,7–15 our results offer a new perspective on the use of financial incentives. When 
individuals can choose whether or not to make financial rewards dependent on adherence, they 
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may become more adherent both because of the direct incentive effect and because the ability 
to choose may increase feelings of personal engagement and empowerment in disease 
management.27 
 
Replication is needed to address the limitations of our study, including its small sample size, as 
well as to determine whether similar findings are obtained in other settings. 
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Table 1. Virologic Suppression in the IC Arm Compared to the PVI Arm and the PC Arm 
 
Panel A: Virologic Suppression in the IC Arm Compared to the PVI Arm 
 Unadj. Odds Ratio [95% conf. int.] 
Adj. Odds Ratio 
[95% conf. int.] 
Virologic suppression at fifth visit 1.16 [0.31,4.36] 
1.57 
[0.25,9.92] 
Virologic suppression at sixth visit 3.17 [0.80,12.59] 
3.38 
[0.77,14.84] 
Panel B: Virologic Suppression in the IC Arm Compared to the PC Arm 
 Unadj. Odds Ratio [95% conf. int.] 
Adj. Odds Ratio 
[95% conf. int.] 
Virologic suppression at fifth visit 1.28  [0.44,3.77] 
1.44 
[0.46,4.49] 
Virologic suppression at sixth visit 2.88* [0.98,8.47] 
3.93** 
[1.19,13.04] 
* p<0.10 
** p<0.05 
 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions where the outcome variable is an indicator 
for virologic suppression (pVL ≤200 copies/mL) at the fifth visit (the last incentivized visit for the 
IC and PVI arms) or at the sixth visit (the unanticipated post-incentive visit for the IC and PVI 
arms). Individuals who are missing a pVL measurement are coded as not suppressed. 
 
The sample in Panel A is only participants in the IC and PVI arms, and this panel reports the 
odds ratio for the IC arm compared to the PVI arm. The unadjusted odds ratio is from a 
regression specification in which the predictor variables are the stratifying variable (an indicator 
for whether or not the majority of the previous three pVL measurements were suppressed) and 
an indicator for the IC arm. The adjusted odds ratio is from a regression specification that adds 
age, gender, race, baseline pVL, and mean pVL in the 6 months prior to the study as predictor 
variables. 
 
The sample in Panel B includes participants in all three arms, and this panel reports the odds 
ratio for the IC arm compared to the PC arm. The unadjusted odds ratio is from a regression 
specification in which the predictor variables are the stratifying variable (an indicator for whether 
or not the majority of the previous three pVL measurements were suppressed), an indicator for 
the PVI arm, and an indicator for the IC arm. The adjusted odds ratio is from a regression 
specification that adds age, gender, race, baseline pVL, and mean pVL in the 6 months prior to 
the study as predictor variables. 
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Figure 1. Percent Virologically Suppressed by Study Arm and Visit Number 
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Supplementary Materials. Algorithm for Choosing Sentinel Medication 
 
The sentinel medication that was placed in a pill bottle with a dose-recording bottle cap for 
participants in the incentive choice (IC) and provider visit incentive (PVI) arms was selected 
using the following algorithm: 
• If the individual has an agent from the protease inhibitor (PI) group, use it as the sentinel 
• If no PI, use a non-nucleoside/tide reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI) as the sentinel 
• If no PI or NNRTI, use raltegravir as the sentinel 
• If no PI or NNRTI or raltegravir, use maraviroc as the sentinel 
• If no PI or NNRTI or raltegravir or maraviroc, use a nucleoside/tide reverse transcriptase 
inhibitor (NRTI) as the sentinel 
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